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INTRODUCTION 
In October 1986, Nizar Hindawi, a Palestinian of Jordanian extrac-
tion, was found guilty by the British courts of concealing explosives in a 
secret compartment of his pregnant girlfriend's suitcase with the intent 
of blowing up an El-Al flight on its way from London to Israel. During 
an internationally publicized trial, the British government had alleged 
that Hindawi had acted under instructions from the Syrian intelligence 
service, traveled to London under a false name on a Syrian diplomatic 
passport and had received active cooperation and encouragement from 
the Syrian embassy staff. As a result, two days after the trial the United 
Kingdom announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Syria. 
The United States, Canada and Austria, supporting Britain, withdrew 
their ambassadors from Damascus in protest of the Syrian government's 
involvement in terrorism. 
The Hindawi trial and the subsequent "punishment" of Syria was 
the culmination of increasing frustration among Western states, and the 
United States in particular, with terrorism in the Middle East. During 
1985 and 1986 the United States led efforts to punish states which sup-
ported or approved of the use of terrorism. In various speeches and 
publications, the American administrators singled out Iran, Libya and 
Syria as the main "criminals" behind terrorism and advocated a tough 
policy of fighting terrorists through diplomatic isolation, intelligence 
gathering, economic pressures, strong condemnations and, as a last 
resort, military reprisals to punish "these perpetrators of violence."1 
Any policy to combat the use of terrorism in the Middle East cannot 
ignore the fact that there has been a continual state of war in the region 
for forty years. Every state and every group in the Middle East has com-
mitted an act of terror as part of a larger strategy towards the war. Solu-
tions to the problem of terrorism will come only with an understanding 
of the various strategies towards the larger conflict. This is particularly 
true of Syria which is an important front-line state in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
To understand the Syrian use of terrorism, it is necessary to examine 
Syrian strategy within the context of its policy towards the Arab-Israel 
conflict. This research attempts to deepen this understanding by address-
ing three main questions: when does Syria use terrorism and against 
whom; what is Syria trying to accomplish when it does use terrorism; and 
is Syrian terrorism related to the Arab-Israeli conflict? The patterns that 
emerge from an exhaustive study of terrorist events suggest that during 
the period studied, Syria used terrorism in four instances: 1) to create 
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pressure in specific situations of negotiation; 2) to express adamant rejec-
tion of policy which would leave Syria regionally isolated; 3) to alleviate 
strain caused by internal disagreement over the regime's Arab-Israeli 
policy; and 4) to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict simmering when there are 
no international or regional plans for war or peace. Conversely, Syria cut 
back on terrorism under three circumstances: 1) to comply with a specific 
agreement such as the Golan I agreement; 2) when the regime is feeling 
strong internally and not isolated externally; and 3) when it needs to 
avoid the rish of premature war. The strongest conclusion of this study is 
that Syria's use of terrorism is related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
that Syria can, does and has controlled the use of terrorism when other 
viable options towards its conflict with Israel are presented. 
METHODOLOGY 
The conclusions about Syrian terrorism were reached through a 
detailed analysis of Syrian policy and action from 1971 to 1977. There 
were several reasons for choosing this six year period. It was necessary to 
limit the range of years studied because no work has been done 
specifically on Syrian terrorism and therefore no public data bank exists. 
Limiting the time-span allowed for detailed examination of each terrorist 
incident. Secondly, 1971 was chosen as a good starting point because it 
marks the beginning of the Asad regime and thus conclusions would still 
have relevance as long as Asad maintains power. Finally, the period from 
1971 to 1977 is a fruitful time to study Syrian policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict because it was a period of great activity and allows for a 
look at Syrian action both under conditions of conflict and negotiation. 
Once the time period was established, information was gathered. 
Hard evidence of Syrian involvement in terrorism is fragmentary and dif-
ficult to come by both because of the professionalism of the operations 
and the intelligence nature of the information.2 The only way to gather 
information is to comb through newspapers and terrorism chronologies 
with a list of assumptions about acts that were either Syrian sponsored 
or, at the minimum, Syrian approved. Information was collected from 
FBIS, Arab Report and Record, New York Times, an-Nahar Arab 
Report and Mickolus' Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of 
Events, 1968-1979. 
The assumptions determining Syrian acts were developed through a 
survey of the literature on Syrian-Palestinian relations, analysis of Syrian 
press commentaries and official speeches, and a survey of official visits 
and military maneuvers. During his sixteen years in power, Asad has 
built up an enormously complex intelligence network with several secret 
services and agencies assigned to work with various Palestinian terrorist 
organizations. Syria has generally carried out terrorism in three ways: 1) 
through Saiqa, the Syrian/Palestinian group which is virtually an in-
tegrated part of the Syrian army; 2) in collaboration with and giving 
logistical support to Palestinian groups which remain largely their own 
masters when outside of Syria;3 and 3) using 'cutouts' or lone terrorists 
to accomplish a specific action. The list of specific assumptions guiding 
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this research and derived from the above information is included in the 
appendix. 
Over 200 separate incidents were gathered and organized into a 
monthly chronology briefly describing each event. (See attached appen-
dix.) The amount of activity was totaled by month to give a general in-
dicator of an increase or decrease in activity." The chronology of Syrian 
terrorism was then analyzed by comparing the monthly terrorist activities 
to other political activities and to the foreign policy goals being pursued 
at that time. What follows is a yearly summary from 1971 to 1977 of 
Syrian policy towards the Israeli dispute, highlighting the use of ter-
rorism in order to ascertain when and why Syria uses terrorism as a tac-
tic. 
SYRIAN STRATEGY UNDER HAFIZ AL-ASAD 
The challenge of Syrian foreign policy under Hafiz al-Asad has been 
to end the costly conflict with Israel while guaranteeing domestic stability 
and regime survival. The recovery of the Golan Heights has always been 
the main priority because the Baath Party's and the military's domestic 
prestige is perceived by Syrian policy-makers as being tied up in the 
Golan. As a military regime, Asad and his advisors are conscious of the 
defense posture of Syria.5 Asad's legitimacy is also linked, via the Baathi 
heritage of his regime, to Arab nationalism. All Syrian actions must 
therefore, at the minimum, be rhetorically rooted in Arab unity.6 
Syria, under Hafiz al-Asad, has cautiously accepted the principle of 
negotiation to resolve the conflict with Israel.7 It has always insisted, 
however, that this be conducted in an international arena and in partner-
ship with others. Syria is a small country (a population of approximately 
9.5 million) and a poor country (per capita income is below $2000). It is 
easily dwarfed by the size of Egypt, the wealth of Saudi Arabia, and the 
development of Israel and has always feared being ignored because of 
that. The only card Syria has felt it holds in bargaining is the ability to in-
sure nothing succeeds without its participation. Syria's strategic position, 
its military strength, and the territory from which that strength can be 
directly deployed (Lebanon, Golan) allows it to influence decisively any 
option against Israel. However, alone, it cannot defeat Israel nor can it 
hope to persuade Israel to bargain. Syria therefore seeks partners.8 
Operating in partnership with other Arabs also allows Syria to bolster its 
Arab legitimacy. 
A negotiated solution to the conflict with Israel is not an easy option 
for Syria because of the nature of its political system. It is much more 
difficult for Damascus to think of contracting out of the conflict than it 
was for Cairo. Syria has no reason to believe the Israelis can easily be 
persuaded into returning the Golan and Syria has not yet had the 
desperate economic problems which would force the regime to choose 
butter over guns. Syria is also more geographically enmeshed in the con-
flict and the Palestinian ties are stronger because of the "Greater Syria" 
idea left over from colonial days and revived in the late 70s. Most impor-
tantly, the legacy of radical nationalism and a strong party system 
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which curtails the president's freedom of action in foreign policy, coupl-
ed with a regime dependent on a minority and iron-fisted rule, has made 
reaching a negotiation consensus difficult.9 
Embedded in the recent history of the Baath Party in Syria is a divi-
sion over the means of resolving the conflict with Israel.10 Ideological or-
thodoxy, represented prior to Asad in Salah Jadid and his radical civilian 
supporters, calls for a people's war of liberation against Israel in associa-
tion with the Palestinians. The more pragmatic Asad and his military 
supporters argue for a strengthened army and a conventional battle 
against Israel in alliance with other Arabs." Although Asad preempted 
the debate through a coup, ideological purity remains in the Baath Party 
and in the Palestinian alliance to continually pressure moves towards a 
negotiating stance. The challenge of Syrian foreign policy towards the 
conflict with Israel is to develop a negotiating position that will not only 
yield results (regain the Golan), but that will insure the security of Syria 
and of the regime while maintaining credible radical ideological or-
thodoxy. A year by year analysis of Syrian policy from 1971 to 1977 will 
demonstrate some of the tactics used to further these goals. 
1971: Hafiz al-Asad did three things upon coming to power in 
November 1970. He sought to end Syria's isolation by joining the Tripoli 
Charter, an alliance between Egypt, Sudan and Libya, which signalled 
his intention to wage a conventional battle against Israel. Secondly, he 
subtly accepted the principal of a negotiated solution by turning to the 
Soviet Union for arms.12 Finally, he ordered the reorganization and con-
trol of the fedayeen groups. The year of 1971 was spent implementing 
these actions. In January, the presidents of the Tripoli Charter states met 
and agreed "to mobilize their various resources and capabilities in order 
to eliminate the effects of the aggressor [and] liberate Arab territory."13 
Preparations for battle included military union with Egypt, putting all 
forces under one command in March, visiting the Soviet Union for arms 
in February and a series of crack-downs on the Palestinians in January, 
at the end of June, early July and October.14 Sadat later revealed that 
war was intended for the end of November or December. 
The terrorist activity during 1971, when Syria was planning the battle 
with Egypt and when, for a short period of time in November and 
December, the battle was imminent, was lower than the previous three 
years (not included in this study). In November and December, when war 
was expected, the activity was at its lowest of the year. The highest 
months of activity, January, July and October are all followed by 
months of dramatic decreases in activity and coincide with the crack-
downs on fedayeen freedom. It suggests that the Asad regime, as it was in-
creasing controls on fedayeen, allowed a brief increase in action to defray 
internal opposition to such a policy. There is also a slight increase in action 
at the end of March when the Baath Congress and general elections were 
being held. From 1971 it can be concluded that terrorism increased for in-
ternal reasons and decreased when conventional battle plans emerged. 
1972: This was a year of frustration for Syrian strategy. The 1971 
war plans had fallen apart because of lack of supplies and organization 
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and, according to Sadat, because superpower attention had been diverted 
by the Indian-Pakistani war. In February, Asad met with Sadat and Qad-
dafi to discuss options towards Israel. Libya and the Palestinians were 
pressuring Asad to "take a true stand on the battle . . . every state has 
the duty to let Palestinians operate from its territory . . . escalation of 
the fedayeen is an essential step so long as we cannot wage a decisive bat-
tle."15 Syria was also having problems with Egypt because of Sadat's 
Soviet dispute. Lacking the cohesive alliance needed to wage a conven-
tional battle, Syria renewed the non-conventional warfare option. In 
June, al-Ahram reported secret resolutions between the three federated 
states "providing support for the fedayeen action and approving its 
operations from all fronts."16 Although Syria accepted the short-term 
strategy of terrorism until conventional battle plans could be arranged, it 
changed the nature of the attacks so as to avoid triggering a surprise 
retaliatory attack on the Golan. Lt. Colonel Izz ad-Din Idris, Assistant 
Director of the Political Bureau of the Syrian Army (the branch in charge 
of supervising Palestinians), called upon the fedayeen to "adopt the 
principle of mobile bases instead of fixed bases . . . [noting] 
maneuverability, flexibility and initiative are among the most important 
tactical qualities of guerrilla warfare."17 Many of the restrictions impos-
ed on the guerrillas in 1971 were temporarily lifted during this period. 
March 1972 was an important month for policy because it was the 
first time Asad publicly stated his regime's cautious commitment to a 
negotiated or "political" solution to the conflict. While at the same time 
searching for a battle alliance and while still determined to fight, the 
Asad regime was also introducing the negotiating option. 
The highest amount of terrorist activity of the six years studied was 
in 1972. The activity in the second half of the year is notable because it 
reflects the tactic of mobile bases. In August the first sign of Syrian in-
volvement outside the immediate war region is seen. September, a month 
of intense activity, mostly because of the flagrance of the acts (Munich 
and the letter bombs),18 was the lowest point in Syrian-Egyptian relations 
because Sadat had expelled the Soviets and thus erased any chance of ac-
quiring sufficient arms for war. The Asad regime was caught during 1972 
in the difficult position of trying, but failing, to maintain a semi-
moderate position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. As long as there was 
no positive action towards a conventional battle in alliance with Egypt, 
to maintain internal stability and credibility, non-conventional tactics 
were used. The only two months of low activity were March and May 
during which time Syria was talking to Egypt and the Soviet Union about 
renewing battle plans. 
1973: The year of the battle was the high point of the early Asad 
strategy. At the beginning of 1973, Syria was in the difficult position of 
having allowed fedayeen action escalate to the point of subjecting 
civilians to retaliatory IDF bombing. There were reports of open tension 
between local residents and fedayeen because of civilian deaths and pro-
perty damage.1' In response, Syria attacked Egypt and Libya for failing 
to support it in 'the battle' and threatened to withdraw from the alliance 
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unless conventional war plans were put into motion. The Syrian army 
once more imposed controls over fedayeen activity and ordered the 
evacuation of the Golan area.20 On April 22, 1973, Asad and Sadat 
secretly agreed to launch a surprise attack against Israel across the Golan 
and Sinai cease-fire lines in the coming fall. The attack was launched in 
October. Although Syria lost rather than gained territory, the success in-
volved in the surprise and in achieving international attention placed 
Syria in a relatively strong bargaining position but only for as long as the 
partnership with Egypt could be maintained. Syria accepted the UN-
sponsored cease-fire and November and December were dedicated to 
working out the Syrian position towards an international conference. 
The pattern of Syrian terrorism in 1973 is simple. It abated from 
1972 levels in January because the cost of Israeli reprisals was threaten-
ing the regime. Once a war decision was made in April, terrorism prac-
tically disappeared except for two outrageous acts in July and September 
which were clearly meant to goad Israel and distract attention away from 
the Golan as war preparations were being put into place. During 
November and December, while the decision about Geneva was being 
made, there were continual cease-fire violations but these were all 
carefully controlled conventional violations. The terrorist activity in 
1973 demonstrates that when civilians were threatened or when conven-
tional war plans were in place, Syria lowered and carefully controlled 
fedayeen action. 
1974: January through May of 1974 was a time of intense consulta-
tion and negotiation for Syria, the purpose of which was to solidify 
Syria's position with regards to negotiation. There was strong internal 
disagreement over the position Syria should take in the Kissinger peace 
efforts. One approach insisted on coordinating policy with Egypt, accep-
ting a disengagement agreement, and attending Geneva without deman-
ding prior Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. The second group argued 
for a policy independent of Egypt, coordination with the Palestinians, 
and a continuation of the boycott of Geneva until Israel withdrew from 
the Golan. Syrian generals were said to be particularly suspicious of talks 
at a time when Israel was reasserting that its forces would never withdraw 
from the Golan.21 These differences were eventually overcome; on April 
9, a Syrian delegation left for Washington to begin negotiations with 
Kissinger on the Golan. It took two months of arduous diplomacy but on 
May 29, 1974, the Golan I agreement was signed which included a tacit 
Syrian promise (via a note from the United States to Israel) not to allow 
further fedayeen action from the Golan. 
The remainder of 1974 was spent trying to move towards a Geneva 
conference by first settling the Palestinian issue. Syria's policy was to in-
sure control over any Palestinian delegation to Geneva. In the latter part 
of the year a serious rift developed between Syria and Egypt as it became 
clear Sadat meant to go ahead with the second stage of disengagement 
without a concomitant agreement on the Golan. Syrian strategy then 
turned from alliance with Egypt to the international front where it began 
a European diplomatic offensive emphasizing Syria's negotiating stance. 
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Arafat's address before the United Nations was seen by Syrian policy-
makers as a victory for this strategy. 
Terrorist activity during 1974 is closely related to the negotiating 
position and internal politics. During the entire five month negotiation 
period, Syria and Israel carried on high level artillery and air battles. 
Although terrorist forces may have participated in this activity, it was all 
waged on a conventional level. Syria's tactic of fighting while talking is a 
product of its political system designed to reduce the strength of 
domestic groups opposed to negotiation while simultaneously pressuring 
Israel and demonstrating the unacceptability of the status quo. In April, 
two days after the Syrian delegation arrived in Washington to open 
negotiations, there was a flagrant terrorist attack on Qiryat Shemona22 
which was clearly meant to pressure Israel and to relieve inner hostility 
against negotiation. The same is true of the dramatic Maalot attack in 
May. By allowing these attacks Syria could send a dual message—one to 
Israel and one to its radical critics. The other attention getting attack on 
a Beit Shean apartment house in November, a few days before the 
UNDOF six-month mandate was about to expire, served the same em-
phatic purpose. Terrorist action increased in August and September but 
it no longer came from the Golan. The data shows that except in two in-
stances, one in 1975 and one in 1976, Syria held to the Golan agreement 
on terrorism. The activity in August and September came from Jordan 
and was meant to pressure Jordan, in addition to Israel, because at the 
end of July Jordan had signed an agreement with Egypt concerning the 
status of the PLO which excluded Syria. Terrorism decreased again in 
November and December when there was a serious threat of war with 
Israel. (Kissinger warned Syria of a possible Israeli attack during his 
November visit.) 
1975: During the first half of 1975, Syria continued attempts to 
negotiate a resolution by going along with Kissinger's efforts in January 
and February and, when those broke apart, by asking the Soviets to 
reconvene Geneva. Syria also continued its public relations offensive in 
the Western press as a way of seeking alternatives to superpower media-
tion. In March, Asad gave an interview and declared that Syria was 
"seriously and explicitly interested in reaching a final peace settlement 
with Israel provided that it included the creation of a Palestinian 
state."23 Syrian policy in the latter half of the year began to change as it 
became clear that the alliance with Egypt was not going to settle the con-
flict in Syria's best interests. Increased involvement in Lebanon led to a 
more ambitious strategy designed to gain hegemony over the immediate 
Arab environment in competition with Egypt rather than cooperation. 
As relations with Egypt worsened, due to Egypt's separate negotiations 
with Kissinger, Syria began to seek other partners in the Palestinians and 
King Hussein. This would lead to the Lebanese invasion in 1976. 
Terrorism in 1975 agrees with previously observed patterns. In 
January and February, as Kissinger was renewing his efforts and while 
Syria still had hopes of being included in the negotiation process, ter-
rorist action was low. In March, when Egypt decided to go ahead with 
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Kissinger without Syria an emphatic act was committed clearly designed 
to embarrass Egypt and remind the United States and Israel that Syria, 
via the Palestinians, could not be ignored. In April, May, June, and Ju-
ly, terrorist activity was low as Syrian hopes for an international con-
ference grew. However, in September, when Sinai II was signed and 
Syria was left isolated without legitimate alternatives, action increased. 
In November another outrageous act occurred in time for the UNDOF 
expiration as a reminder that Syria still considered itself to be at war. 
1976: This was a year of inactivity on the Arab-Israeli front but of 
great activity for Syrian policy as it attempted to settle the Lebanese pro-
blem in a way that would benefit its position vis-à-vis Israel. The inva-
sion of Lebanon was, in part, designed to further the Eastern Front 
strategy where Palestinian leadership would be "restructured to accom-
modate Syrian policy [so that Syria would] emerge as a dominant factor 
in the Middle East settlement because it was able to deliver Syrians, Jor-
danians, Lebanese and Palestinians to a settlement."24 
Relations with Egypt continued to be strained in the first half of 
1976 as did relations with Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union who both 
objected to Syrian interference in Lebanon. However, in October, once 
its position in Lebanon had been established, Syria acknowledged Arab 
pressure and reconciled with Sadat. Sadat agreed not to push for Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon and Asad agreed to end criticism of Sinai II 
and resume diplomatic relations and cooperation with Egypt. Syria had, 
in a sense, reached a position of equality with Egypt and that, combined 
with the newly established control over the Palestinians, gave Syria the 
needed strength to proceed with a bargaining process. With the election 
of Jimmy Carter, the future for a negotiated solution to the conflict with 
Israel looked bright. 
Terrorist activity in 1976 related to domestic concerns. Heavily in-
volved in Lebanon, Syria and its Palestinian allies could not afford to 
wage a battle of subterfuge with Israel. The only two months of signifi-
cant activity are April and July. In April, one of the two acts committed 
was undertaken against a Palestinian group thus pressuring it to conform 
to Syrian peace-making efforts. The other brief action on the Golan 
could be related to the need to divert domestic and Palestinian attention 
away from Syrian collusion with the United States and rightist elements 
in Lebanon. The series of explosions in July was designed to defray the 
growing opposition within Syria to the Lebanese invasion. That the ter-
rorist activity was low is consistent with the observation that when engag-
ed in conventional warfare, Syrian terrorist activity decreases. 
1977: January 1977 was a time of optimism for the Arabs and par-
ticularly for Syria. The Arab coalition, on the surface, was strong: the 
Palestinians were chastened and under control; Syrian relations with Jor-
dan and Egypt were good; Israel had indicated a willingness to negotiate 
(September 1976); and Carter was anxious to try his hand at resolving the 
conflict. 
On March 9, 1977, Carter issued a statement which appeared to 
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support the Israeli policy of not returning all the land acquired in 1967. 
This was a change from previous American policy. In reaction, the 
Syrian government newspaper al-Thawrah responded with the strong 
statement that the only "just solution to the Middle East conflict lay in 
total Israeli withdrawal."25 This represented a hardening of the Syrian 
position. However, Tishrin, a better indicator of Asad's mood, adopted 
a more conciliatory tone indicating that the regime, while still probably 
divided, was willing to give Carter a chance. The Asad government con-
tinued efforts towards reconvening a Geneva conference which led to a 
successful meeting between Carter and Asad in May. However, before 
the good will of that meeting could be translated into policy, Israeli elec-
tions produced a more militant line from Israel which changed the Syrian 
mood dramatically. Syrian suspicions about a separate peace approach 
were seemingly confirmed in the summer when, during Vance's tour of 
the Middle East, Egypt and the United States proposed the idea of a 
'working group' of foreign ministers to meet before Geneva as a way of 
circumventing the Palestinian issue. Syria saw the proposal as an attempt 
to split the Arab bargaining position. During this period Syria was also 
facing internal opposition to the Lebanese occupation as well as increas-
ed Israeli involvement in Lebanon and therefore did not have the 
strength to accept change in the negotiation process. As a result, the 
Syrian line hardened. In November, Sadat made his historic decision to 
go to Jerusalem. 
According to Syrian policy-makers, Sadat's action destroyed 
everything Syria had been working for. The only cards Syria felt it had in 
bargaining were the threat of activating the war option, kept believable 
through Arab unity, Soviet backing in negotiation, and the withholding 
of the recognition of Israel until Arab demands were met. Sadat erased 
all three Syrian strengths by going to Jerusalem. Given the nature of its 
domestic political arrangements and the increasing Israeli challenge in 
Lebanon, Syria was not capable of following Sadat's initiative. The 
momentum moved away from an international conference towards a 
separate Egyptian-Israeli settlement leaving Syria isolated and im-
mobilized. In a sense, Syria was back to the stalemated position of 1972 
with no hopes for peace and no potential for war. 
Terrorist patterns were consistent with previous years. In January 
and February, while embarking on a new plan for negotiation, there was 
no terrorist activity. In March there was a brief flurry of activity in 
response to Carter's statement which was most likely meant to quell in-
ternal disagreement about trusting Carter. Terrorism disappeared again 
until June and then rapidly escalated in July and August in reaction to 
rising Israeli militancy and American/Egyptian agreements. The attacks 
stopped in September and October when Israeli aircraft and tanks 
entered Southern Lebanon thus directly threatening Syrian conventional 
forces. Terrorism predictably rose again to high levels in November and 
December in reaction to the isolation and frustration caused by Sadat's 




The Syrian use of terrorism from 1971 to 1977 can be explained in 
terms of Syrian strategy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Several pat-
terns emerge. The most consistent pattern was an increase in terrorism 
when the failure of Syrian efforts to stir the conflict, either towards war 
or negotiation, resulted in a period with no coherent alternative being ac-
tively pursued. Another discernible pattern is perceptible between 
domestic disagreements over policy towards the conflict and brief in-
creases in terrorism. A third characteristic of the Syrian use of terrorism 
was the use of provocative actions to apply pressure on friend or foe in 
order to achieve a specific negotiating purpose. Such acts can be called 
'emphatic' terrorism because they are deliberately dramatic and are 
designed to focus attention on Syrian purpose. A fourth pattern in 
Syrian terrorism was the decrease in action when conventional war was 
planned or on-going. Decreases in action are also seen when negotiation 
was proceeding to Syria's benefit and when agreement had been reached. 
A final pattern observed is the temporary decrease in activity, or a 
change in the pattern of activity, when Israeli retaliation escalated to 
threatening levels. 
From the patterns observed from 1971 to 1977, a tentative conclu-
sion about Syrian use of terrorism can be reached. Syria uses terrorism as 
a tactic when it lacks viable alternatives either for war or peace. As a 
result, two policy options to curb Syrian use of terrorism are available. 
The first option is intensive retaliation which threatens regime stability. 
Israeli retaliation against civilians and conventional forces has worked to 
inhibit Syrian terrorism temporarily because the Asad regime cannot af-
ford a war it has not started itself on its own terms. However, the pat-
terns of this research suggest retaliation is only a transient solution. It is 
also not an appropriate response for non-Middle Eastern states whose 
roles in the Middle East have been, and should be, that of mediators in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than combatants. The premise of media-
tion is that "sufficient respect and good-will exist toward the mediator 
for the antagonist to be amenable to his interpretations of their dif-
ferences . . . . " " Western retaliation against Syria as a solution to the 
Syrian use of terrorism, although temporarily effective, will only serve to 
destroy what little good-will there is towards the West and will pro-
mulgate the very conflict which needs to be resolved. 
A second, but more difficult, policy option remains. The patterns of 
this research project suggest that Syrian terrorism declines when negotia-
tion is ongoing or when a satisfying agreement has been reached. Any 
negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict which involves Syria will 
be an arduous and lengthy process. The emphatic use of terrorism can be 
expected to continue up to the last minute; however, if an acceptable set-
tlement is reached, Syria can be expected to abide by it. The Asad regime 
has very carefully outlined its position on negotiation; the flexibility of 
that position has never been tested and, in the last ten years, the possibili-
ty of a negotiated solution involving Syria has been ignored. By em-
phasizing Syria's terrorism and ignoring the larger context of the Arab-
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Israeli conflict, the Western world is losing the opportunity to resolve 
one of the world's most troubling conflicts. Although it may seem a cir-
cuitous solution to the problem of terrorism, re-opening negotiation on 
the problem of the Palestinians and the Golan Heights in an interna-
tional conference will be more effective in stopping Syrian terrorism than 
any threat or punishment. 
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The assumptions guiding the collection of information in the 
chronology are as follows: 
1. Fedayeen action carried out in the Golan after Asad's rise to 
power is assumed to be Syrian-approved because the Asad regime made 
it a clear policy as of February 1970 that there was to be no fedayeen ac-
tion from Syrian-controlled territory without prior Syrian approval. This 
is true of attacks carried out from Mt. Hermon and the Arquob region of 
Lebanon which was dominated by Syrian-backed PLA after September 
197Q. 
2. All acts carried out from Jordan after the summer of 1971 are 
assumed to be Syrian-approved because all the fedayeen were expelled 
from Jordan in September. To infiltrate Jordan it was necessary to come 
from Syria. Because of an agreement with King Hussein, the Syrian 
authorities carefully controlled the border with Jordan to prevent in-
filtration. Any fedayeen operating from Jordan did so with Syrian ap-
proval or suffered punishment. 
3. Actions claimed by Damascus Radio are assumed to be Syrian-
approved. 
4. Actions carried out and claimed by Syrian-supported groups such 
as Saiqa, PLA and ALF are always included in the chronology. 
5. Actions carried out by other Palestinian groups such as the PFLP-
GC, the PDFLP and the PFLP are assumed to be Syrian-approved when 
those groups are in harmony with Syria. The relationship between these 
groups and Syria fluctuates back and forth. It was therefore necessary to 
determine whether they were in favor with Syria by monitoring whether 
their communiqués and publications were censored or not, whether their 
spoken goals conflicted with Syria's and whether they were included in 
Syrian-sponsored Palestinian meetings or not. 
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Guerrilla attacks on Israeli posts in Golan. 
Guerrilla attack on UN Observer post. 
Guerrillas and Israeli soldiers clash on Golan. 
Exchange of fire involving guerrillas. 
Seven fedayeen infiltrating Golan captured and 
killed. 
Clashes with infiltrators on Golan. 
Rocket and other attacks on Golan. 
Four captured, four killed in largest of recent 
attacks on Golan. 
Outbreak of firing on Golan. " , 
Three infiltrators killed in Golan clash. 
Two killed, one wounded in Golan clash. 
Guerrilla firing in Golan. 
Eight fedayeen, one Syrian officer killed in clash 
on Golan. 
Exchange of fire on Golan. 
Highest number of fedayeen incidents in Golan 
in recent months including mortar fire. 
Border action in Golan. 
Three separate infiltration attempts. 
Fedayeen from Syria damage Trans-Arabian 
pipe-line. 
More damage to pipe-line on Syrian border. 
Assassination attempt on Arafat while visiting 
Golan. 
Exchange of fire on Mt. Hermon. 
Fedayeen incidents reported on Golan. 









































Mine and rocket attacks in Golan reported by 
Damascus Radio. 
Rockets fired from Lebanese border at 
Kfar Blum and Qiryat Shemona reported 
by Damascus Radio. 
Damascus Radio reports fedayeen attack on 
camp in Golan with rockets. 
More rocket attacks near Qunaitra. 
Clash of fedayeen and Israeli patrol. 
Fedayeen rocket attack on Tal Abu Qithat. 
Israeli patrol ambushed. 
Katyusha rockets fired at Israeli positions. 
Fedayeen lay and detonate minefield in Golan. 
Damascus communiqué announces fedayeen 
attack on camp in Firdawi area. 
Rocket attack in Khushniya area. 
Shells fired at Israeli positions in Golan. 
Mortar fire from Kfar Shuba (SW Lebanon) 
Fedayeen attack-post near Qunaitra. 
Fedayeen attack observation post in Golan. 
Attack on Israeli position near Jukhdar in 
Golan. 
Firing in Nahal Golan region. 
Fedayeen clash with patrols after setting fire to 
Israeli plants in Yaqouta area. 
Fighters of Abu Ah Iya (Damascus) attack El-Al 
settlement in Golan. Later undertook rocket at-
tack. 
Damascus communiqués on mortar and rocket 
attacks near Qunaitra. 
Heavy rockets and shells fired at camps in 
Qunaitra. 
Fedayeen attack posts in Golan. 
Firing reported from Syrian territory in Golan. 
Clash in Dubbasiya in Golan with machine guns 
and rockets. 
Fedayeen attack Israeli positions in Golan. 
More attacks in Golan including destruction of 
electronic fortifications at Qunaitra. 
Attacks on pipeline and reports of fighting 
between PFLP and PFLP-GC. 
Firing south-west of Sea of Galilee. 
















































Bazooka attack from Syrian territory in Golan. 
Israeli truck blown up near Qunaitra. 
Four infiltrators killed in Golan. 
Two Israeli soldiers killed by mine in Golan. 
PFLP-GC fire rockets at Israeli bus in Golan. 
Settlements in Golan attacked with rockets and 
mortar. 
Shelling of Qunaitra. 
Shelling of Khushniya. 
Guerrillas rocketed village of Banias. 
Bazooka attacks in Golan. 
Israeli engineering patrol ambushed in Golan. 
Jibbin settlement in Golan rocketed and 
mortared. 
Bridge destroyed in Saluqiya region. 
Bazooka attacks and shelling on Golan from 
Syria. 
Bomb placed in portable record player stored in 
baggage on El-Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. 
Record player given to British girl by Syrian _ 
boyfriend. 
Settlements in Golan attacked by guerrillas. 
Rocket and mortar attacks on Nahal Golan. 
Munich Olympic attack on Israeli athletes. 
Shelling, small-arms fire in Mt. Hermon area. , 
Two Israeli soldiers ambushed in Mt. Hermon. 
Fedayeen shell Qunaitra and Nahal Golan. 
Jibbin settlement in Golan attacked with 
rockets and bridge blown up. 
Israeli positions shelled in Golan. 
PFLP-GC letter-bombs to various Zionist 
organizations in Europe, Israel and US. 
More letter-bombs throughout Middle East. 
PFLP planted network of rockets and bombs in 
Golan. 
Nahal Golan under mortar fire from Syria. 
Israeli patrol ambushed in Golan. 
Fierce fighting lasting more than eight hours in 
Golan. 
Two Israeli vehicles hit mine in Nahal Golan. 
Israeli soldiers killed by mine in Jordan Valley. 











































Two Israeli military vehicles destroyed by mine 
in Golan. 
Guerrillas attack Israeli position near Dabusiya. 
Firing from Syrian territory reported. 
Fedayeen attack Israeli troops and vehicles in 
Golan. 
Shells fired at Israeli positions in Golan. 
Fedayeen attack on Golan. 4 
Three Black September arrested in Vienna with 
sketches of Schonau camp. One admitted to 
casinglt. Carrying Syrian passports. 
Israeli patrols attacked by fedayeen in Golan. 3 
Clash of forces in Golan. 
0 
Three fedayeen infiltrating from Golan killed. 6 
Fedayeen attack Israeli positions in Golan. 
Fedayeen attack patrol in Debusiya. 
Rockets fired from Syrian territory at Qunaitra. 
Fedayeen/Israeli patrol clash. Fedayeen admit 
Syrian approval of raid. i 
PFLP-GC attempt to blow up pipeline in 
Zahrani. 
Clashes in Lebanon between Saiqa and Fateh. 
PFLP-GC kill Colonel Yosef Alon, one of 
Israel's most famous pilots, in Rome. 
Israeli patrol stumbles into guerrilla ambush in 
Golan. 
Heavy mortar attack by fedayeen in Golan. 
Eagles of Revolution (Saiqa) take five hostages 
on passenger train from Czechoslovakia to 
Austria demanding the closure of Austrian 
Soviet Jew emigration center. 
War.** 0 
Artillery battles in north Golan. 0 




































Artillery and tank battles in Golan.** 
More clashes in Golan.** 
Fedayeen attack Israeli positions in Mt. 
Hermon. 
Ceasefire violations along Syrian front.** 
Tank and artillery battles on front.** 
Clashes continue but lessen in intensity.** 
Forces clash in Golan.** 
More clashes.** 
Syrian artillery shell Golan settlements.** 
Fighting over Mt. Hermon continues through 
month. 
PFLP-GC enter Qiryat Shemona via SW 
Lebanese border attacking apartment complex. 
Saiqa spokesman says "We promise to under-
take more such operations.''' 
Golan fighting with ground and air forces 
continue.** 
PDFLP attack on Maalot. 
Fedayeen infiltrating from Golan captured with 
plans for second Maalot-like attack. 
Attacks on post on eastern shore of Galilee. 
Fighting in Golan ends.** 
Three Fateh fedayeen captured infiltrating from 
Syria near Jordan River carrying six bazookas 
and machine-guns 
More fedayeen infiltrators from Syria via Jor-
dan captured. 
PDFLP Damascus communiqué claims attempts 
to enter Hanita from Western end of Lebanese 
border killed by Israeli troops—intended to seize 
hostages. 
Two fedayeen infiltrating from Jordan captured 


































Israeli and Syrian forces in Golan on alert but 
no outbreak.** 
PDFLP enter Beit Shean apartment house kill-
ing four civilians. (Announced in Damascus.) 
Fedayeen ambush Israeli patrol on Mt. Hermon. 
Units of PLA, usually stationed in Syria, arrive 
in South Lebanon to help guerrillas resist Israeli 
attack. 
Fateh fedayeen used rubber dinghies to land in 
Tel Aviv took hostages at Hotel Savoy. Asked 
to fly to Damascus. Said trained in Damascus. 
Were told to say from Port Said, Egypt. 
Slogan: "Kissinger's efforts will fail." 
Three Israelis wounded in clash with fedayeen 
on Mt. Hermon. 
Israel reports hundreds of fedayeen crossed 
into Lebanon from Syria. 
Rockets fired at Qiryat Shemona from SW 
Lebanon. 
Fedayeen rocket firing from Jordanian territory. 
Four Saiqa members arrested in Amsterdam 
planning to hijack Warsaw-Amsterdam express 
to stop Soviet emigration to Israel. 
Four fedayeen (1 Syrian) take Egyptian embassy 
hostage denouncing Sinai. 
Forces clash in Golan. 
Fedayeen cross into Israel via Jordan captured 
with mortar shells, explosives and small arms. 
Intended to shell Neo Hakikar and sabotage in-
stallations in area. 



































23 pounds explosives inside luggage near 
coffeehouse in Jerusalem. Damascus Radio 
claims for Fateh. 
PDFLP attacked Israeli yeshiva farm in Golan 
at Ramit Magashimim. 
Saiqa attacks on Israeli army patrols in N. 
Galilee. Damascus Radio reports. Also attacks 
on Qiryat Shemona. 
Katyusha rockets fired at northern Galilee from 
SW Lebanon. 
Israel reports fewest incidents of fedayeen action 
since 1966.** 
First attack on Israeli patrols since November 
'75 from Syrian borders; fedayeen fired rockets 
at patrols. 
PFLP and Saiqa forces clash in Beirut. 
One fedayeen operation reported in Golan 
sometime in April. 
PDFLP (currently friendly with Syria) attack 
Israeli bridges, infiltrated from Jordan, said to 
be in retaliation for shooting relative of former 
Jordanian Premier during riots in Nablus. 
Saiqa claims responsibility for bus explosion in 
West Bank. There has been continuous light ex-
plosion activity in West Bank rumored 
engineered by Saiqa cell. 
Fedayeen crossing Dead Sea from Jordan clash 
with patrol. 
Shimon Peres disclosed Israeli and Syrian 
officers met in presence of UN to discuss 
reunion of Druze families. 
Syria agrees to help fedayeen return to military 
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Fedayeen successfully launched rocket attack 
from Jordan on Neve Ur, important Israeli 
target. 
Explosion in Tel Aviv market place claimed by 
Fateh, PDFLP, Saiqa and ALF. 
Bombs daily in public places claimed by above 
mentioned groups. 
Israeli forces report killing two fedayeen, 
injuring third, crossing border and planning at-
tack three miles south of Sea of Galilee. 
Nablus explosions claimed by PLO or Saiga. 
Qiryat Shemona bus explosion (planted from 
Arqoub region.) 
More Nablus explosions. 
Israeli aircraft and tanks enter South Lebanon 
on side of rightist. Syrian army positions shelled 
but did not take up challenge. 
Seven bomb explosions in public places in West 
Bank, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv similar to 
previous explosions. 
Two bombs exploded in Egyptian embassy in 
Damascus; no injuries; slight damage; came 
after Sadat's departure from Syria. 
Reports that Syrian authorities plotting to 
assassinate Egyptian embassy staff in Beirut. 
Explosive-laden suitcase removed from Beirut 
residence of Egyptian diplomat. 
Thirteen pounds^of explosives in suitcase found 












































Two rockets, dynamite found in vegetable cart 
near Egyptian embassy in Beirut. 
Bomb damaged three Egyptian organization 
buildings in Beirut. 
Bomb exploded in car belonging to Syrian em-
bassy in front of Egyptian embassy in London. 
Egyptian security official defused four pound 
bomb hidden in shopping bag by Egyptian em-
bassy in West Germany. 
Intelligence office in Jerusalem blown up. 
Explosion in office in Jaffa. 
Jerusalem office explosion (all three claimed by 
SANA 5 Feb. 1978). 
Saiqa claims explosion of bus in Jerusalem 
killing forty. 
PLO attack in Israel announced over Damascus 
Radio. 
Damascus Radio reported fedayeen operation 
against soldiers in Jerusalem. 
Two PLO members, in coordination with Syrian 
intelligence, seize hostages in Iraqi embassy in 
Libya. 
Attack on Iraqi officials in Pakistan. 
PFLP-GC blow up headquarters of Iraqi-backed 
Palestinian group in Beirut. 
Fateh fedayeen traveling from Damascus shoots 
Iraqi embassy employee. 
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